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 The author thinks that the consensus that used to exist in Poland regarding its 
membership in the European Union does no longer exist after the parliamentary 
elections in September of 2001. Two anti-European parties entered the parliament: 
the radical-populist Self-defense and the League of Polish Families, representing 
the fundamentalist Catholic right. The author claims that the opponents of the 
Polish integration into the EU are too weak in the Parliament to stop this process. 
Though Poland enjoys the support of the states such as Germany, France and 
Great Britain, the outcome of the Polish referendum on joining the EU, scheduled 
for the end of 2003 is far from certain. The reason for this is an intensified politi-
cal campaign of the parliamentary parties opposed to Poland's EU membership 
and the unfavourable economic situation. The author concludes that the success of 
the referendum to a large extent depends on the efficiency of the government's 
economic policy in the first two years of its term. 
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 After the last parliamentary election (of 23 September 2001) the leader of the 
victorious Left and presently the new Prime Minister of Poland Leszek Miller declared 
that becoming one of the new members of the European Union in its next enlargement 
would constitute the most important goal of the Polish government. Though the task is 
not new, the situation in which Poland is awaiting the EU enlargement is in many ways 
new and complicated. 
 
* The paper is an updated version of the lecture presented at the conference organised jointly by the 
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 The changing political situation and the European integration 
 From the very beginning of the democratic transformation, all successive Polish 
governments actively sought co-operation with, and eventually membership in, the 
European Union. On 19 September 1989, Poland and the European Community signed 
the agreement on trade and economic co-operation and on 16 December 1991, the 
European Agreement on association of Poland with the European Community and its 
members was also signed. On 9 May 1993, Poland obtained the status of an associated 
partner of the West European Union. On 8 April 1994 Poland officially applied for 
membership in the European Union. On 26 July 1996, the Polish government submitted 
to the European Commission its answers to the lengthy questionnaire containing 
questions relevant to the evaluation of Poland's preparation for this membership. On 8 
August 1996, the law on the formation of the Committee on European Integration was 
adopted by the Polish Parliament. Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz became 
the chairman of the Committee assuring a high level of political responsibility for the 
work of this body. In January 1997, the Council of Ministers submitted to the Parlia-
ment its official document on “National Strategy of Integration”. In July 1997 the Euro-
pean Commission invited Poland to enter the negotiations on EU membership.  
 In September 1997, following the defeat of the then ruling coalition of the Alliance 
of Democratic Left (SLD) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL), the new Centre-Right 
Cabinet of Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek commenced the prolonged negotiations con-
cerning the terms of the enlargement. Within the governing coalition of the Electoral 
Action Solidarity and the Union of Freedom the dominant orientation was strongly in 
favour of the enlargement. This was particularly true of the Union of Freedom, whose 
leader Bronislaw Geremek became Poland's new foreign minister. Within the Electoral 
Action Solidarity there existed, however, a Eurosceptical minority, represented particu-
larly by the Christian National Alliance. This minority was unable to stop the process of 
negotiations but quite effectively prolonged them by insisting on the conditions unac-
ceptable for the European Union. Two issues in particular became the bone of conten-
tion: the length of time after which foreigners would be able to buy land in Poland and 
the waiting period for Polish workers to obtain the permission to work in the other EU 
countries. In May 2000, the Union of Freedom withdrew its ministers from the govern-
ment because of a number of domestic disagreements not related to the European inte-
gration. Governing by means of a minority cabinet, Jerzy Buzek was unable to effec-
tively control the Eurosceptical wing in the governing bloc. The result was that Poland 
began to lag behind the other Central European states in the process of European nego-
tiations. One of the paradoxes of this situation was that Poland – along with the Czech 
Republic and Hungary – became a new NATO member in March of 1999, thereby 
achieving a higher level of political and military integration with the West than most 
postcommunist states. Some critics of the European integration even argued that as a 
member of NATO Poland did not need membership in the EU so badly. It should be 
remembered, however, that in late 1990s, in Poland – unlike in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary – the parties opposed to the European integration remained outside the Parlia-
ment and the support for the EU was stronger than in the two other Central European 
states which together with Poland had been admitted to NATO (Neumayer, 1998: 75-
117). 
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 The situation changed recently following the parliamentary elections of 23 Septem-
ber 2001. The election was a disaster for the parties that had won the 1997 election. 
Both the Electoral Action Solidarity and the Union of Freedom failed to reach the le-
gally required threshold for the election to Sejm (the lower house). The winner of the 
election was the Left. The results were as follows:  
 
a) Lower House (Sejm) 
Alliance of Democratic Left – Union of Labour  41.04% (216 seats) 
Citizens Platform 12.68%   (65 seats) 
Self-defense 10.20 %  (53 seats) 
Law-and-Justice 9.50%   (44 seats)  
Polish People’s Party 8.98 %  (42 seats)  
League of Polish Families 7.87%   (38 seats)  
German Minority (2 seats) 
 
b) Senate  
Alliance of Democratic Left – Union of Labour 75 senators 
Bloc Senate 2001 15 senators  
Polish People’s Party 4 senators  
Self-defense 2 senators 
League of Polish Families 2 senators  
Others 2 senators1  
 
 The new Cabinet headed by the leader of the SLO Leszek Miller is based on the 
three-party coalition of the SLO, the Union of Labour and the PSL. It is strongly com-
mitted to the European integration and already in its first weeks in office has modified 
Poland's integration strategy by adopting a more flexible negotiating position on the 
controversial issues of the sale of land and access to the European labour market. The 
last Prime Minister of the Left-of-Center Cabinet, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, became 
Poland's new minister of foreign affairs. He instantly undertook the initiative to revise 
Poland's negotiating position and to expedite the process of accession. 
 The last election had, however, a paradoxical effect on the process of Poland's 
integration with the EU. On the positive side, there is now a strong governing coalition 
committed to the policy of constructive dialogue with the European Union and to en-
tering the EU in 2004. The fact that most of the key states of the EU are now governed 
by social democrats makes it much easier for the new Polish government to speed up 
the negotiations. Miller's and Cimoszewicz's visits to Brussels and to the capitals of the 
 
1 “Bloc Senate 2001” was an ad hoc coalition of candidates from the Electoral Action Solidarity, the 
Union of Freedom, the Citizens Platform, the Law-and-Justice and the independents from Center-Right. 
Election to the Senate is based on a plurality system without thresholds. 
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key European states resulted in a strong support for Poland's efforts to join the Union in 
the nearest wave of enlargement. The policy of integration is strongly supported by 
President Aleksander Kwasniewski whose reelection in October 2000 made his political 
position even stronger than before. In the Parliament, the government can count on the 
largest party of the opposition (Citizens Platform) in implementing the policy of Euro-
pean integration.  
 There is, however, the other side of the coin. The elections of 2001 brought to the 
Parliament – for the first time – two openly anti-European parties: the radical populist 
Samoobrona (“Self-defense”) and the League of Polish Families – a new party of the 
fundamentalist Catholic Right. In the Sejm they do not have enough seats to block the 
process of integration but enough to make the opposition to it visible. The previous con-
sensus of the Polish political elite on the issue of the European integration no longer 
exists. Since Poland is due to vote on the integration in the national referendum tenta-
tively scheduled for late 2003, it is reasonable to predict that this issue will become the 
crucial cleavage in Poland's politics. 
 
 Polish public opinion on European integration 
 In recent years, the support for the European integration in Poland has been dimin-
ishing rather rapidly. In May 1996, the major public opinion survey centre (CBOS-Cen-
trum Badania Opinii Spolecznej) asked its respondents how they would vote in a hypo-
thetical referendum on Poland’s membership in NATO and the European Union. 83% 
of the respondents declared that they would vote for the membership in NATO and 80% 
that they would vote for the EU membership. Since then, the support for NATO has re-
mained high, even after the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in early 1999, but the 
support for Poland’s integration with the EU has been going down. In April 1997, 72% 
of CBOS respondents decleared their readiness to vote for the EU, 11% declared that 
they would vote against (with 17% undecided or saying that they would not vote at all). 
In April 1998, CBOS registered a futher decline of the support, with only 62% of re-
spondents declaring that they would vote for the EU membership, 12% declaring that 
they would vote against it, and 26% undecided or abstaining. Another survey research 
centre, Institute for Public Affairs, confirmed these findings. In its survey of February 
1998 64% of respondents declared they support for Poland’s membership in the EU, but 
in June 1998 only 58% still supported this option, with 21% undecided, 10% opposed 
and 11% abstaining. The downward trend continues. In the OBOP (Osrodek Badania 
Opinii Publiczney) survey conducted in September 2001 only 50% declared that they 
would vote for Poland’s membership in the EU, 30% were opposed and 20% had no 
opinion. Among the oldest respondents (60 and over) only 39% were in favour of the 
integration. Among peasants 65% respondents declared that they would vote against the 
integration and only 16% were for it. 
 After the election, another survey conducted by the PBS (Pracownia Badan Spolec-
znych) for the daily Rzeczpospolita found that only 49% of the respondents were ready 
to vote for Poland's accession to the EU, 13% declared their intent to vote against, 19% 
declared that they would not vote in the referendum, and the remaining 19% that they 
were undecided (Europejski barometer, 2001). The sociological profiles of the support-
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ers and the opponents of the accession showed that the men were more likely to support 
it than the women, the older people less likely to support it than the younger ones. Edu-
cation was positively correlated with the willingness to vote for, and social groups 
frustrated with their economic situation (small farmers, pensioners, unskilled workers) 
were less likely to support the integration than the social groups that have benefited 
from the transformation. 
 These findings confirm the results of the earlier CBOS poll of April 1998 which 
studied in depth the character of the support and the opposition to Poland's membership 
in the European Union. It identified the following main fears: harmful effects on the ag-
riculture (mentioned by 54% of the respondents), foreigners buying land in Poland 
(64% against foreigners buying agricultural land, 71% against foreigners buying forests, 
and 51% against foreigners buying houses in Poland), and the adaptation to the laws of 
the Union (considered by 44% of respondents as “difficult”). Interestingly enough, 
ideological issues (such as “Christian values”, national sovereignty) were mentioned by 
significantly fewer respondents (13%) (CBOS, 1998). 
 In its 1998 survey the Centre introduced a scale measuring the relative intensity of 
support or opposition to the European integration. The scale was composed of five pairs 
of statements, to which respondents could respond by expressing their support or oppo-
sition on a scale from 1 (strongest support for the integration) to 7 (strongest opposi-
tion). The statements were as follows:  
1) “For Poland it would be good to become a member of the EU as soon as possible” 
versus: “For Poland it would be best to become a EU member at the latest possible 
time”;  
2) “For Poland it would be most beneficial to adjust quickly and completely its laws to 
the laws of the European Union” versus “For Poland it would be best to adopt the 
longest possible transitory policy”;  
3) “Integration of Poland with the EU will bring Poland more benefits than damage” 
versus “Integration of Poland with the EU will bring Poland more damage than 
benefits”;  
4) “Integration of Poland with the EU for me personally will bring more benefits than 
damage” versus “Integration of Poland with the EU for me personally will bring 
more damage than benefits”;  
5) “Poland will benefit from its EU membership more than the member states of the 
Union” versus “The EU member states will benefit from the Polish membership in 
the EU more than Poland”.  
 The number of points obtained by individual respondents (from 5 to 35) were di-
vided by 5 (the number of responses) and the respondents were assigned their individual 
scores from 1 (most proeuropean) to 7 (least proeuropean). The respondents strongly 
supportive of the European integration (1-3 points on the scale) constituted 37% of the 
sample, middle-roaders (3-5 points) constituted 45%, and the opponents of the integra-
tion (5-7 points) only 18%. However, in the middle category only 60% declared their 
willingness to vote for the membership in the EU, and in the category of the opponents 
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49% declared that they would vote against the integration. With the possibility that the 
public opinion may evolve in the direction of greater scepticism, the potential support 
for the membership may dwindle even further.  
 The CBOS survey allows also to construct sociological profiles of the supporters 
and the opponents of the integration. The support for the European integration is posi-
tively correlated with education, socio-economic status, better economic conditions, 
living in cities over 100,000 inhabitants, and negatively correlated with age. The oppo-
sition to the integration is strongest among people over 65 years of age, living in the 
countryside and working in agriculture, the people with the lowest income and educa-
tion. The support for the integration is stronger among the respondents who declare 
rightist political preferences than among those of the leftist views – a possible conse-
quence of the overrepresentation of poorer people among the supporters of the Left. In 
terms of general attitudes, the supporters of the integration tend to be more optimistic 
than the opponents. One may conclude that the support is stronger among the winners 
than among the losers of the democratic transformation and the transition to the market 
economy.  
 
 Perspectives for the future 
 The prospects of Poland's integration depend on the state of negotiations and on the 
state of public mind in Poland. The first aspect is much easier to predict. The new gov-
erning coalition considers the admission of Poland in the first wave of enlargement as 
the national priority. It is free from those internal pressures which made the Buzek 
Cabinet deadlocked in its negotiation strategy which seriously jeopardized the prospect 
of Poland's integration. The opponents of the integration are too weak in the Parliament 
to effectively stop the process. The governments of the member states, particularly the 
biggest ones – Germany, the United Kingdom and France – support Poland's early ad-
mission so strongly that it is virtually guaranteed that Poland will be among the very 
first countries to be admitted.  
 Provided Poland remains committed to achieving this goal. If the referendum took 
place today, the majority of voters would vote for the integration, but the margin would 
probably be small. Many of those who declare their lack of opinion do this for the op-
portunistic reasons of political correctness. They will most likely vote against the inte-
gration if they decide to take part in the vote.  
 There are two dangers for the eventual vote. First, the opponents of the integration 
have received – for the first time – a strong platform in the Parliament from which they 
are now able to conduct their campaign more effectively. While they lack a sufficient 
number of votes in the Parliament to sabotage the process of integration, they can bene-
fit from their role in the parliamentary life to intensify their public campaign. Launching 
it from the Parliament gives them two advantages: a privileged access to the media and 
the respectability. Their campaign may become more effective.  
 The second danger stems from the economic situation. The Cabinet of the Right left 
the economy in a much worse state than it inherited in 1997. The annual rate of GNP 
growth went down from over 6% to less than 2% and the unemployment went up from 
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10 to 16 percent, reaching the alarming figure of more than three million people. The in-
flation went down too – from over 14 percent to a little more than 5 percent – but the 
cost of it was the slowing down of economic growth. Because of the costly reforms of 
territorial administration, public health, education and pensions, the deficit in state fi-
nances reached an alarming level. In the first half of 2001 the minister of finance dis-
closed that the deficit in the state finances reached the level of over 80 billion Polish 
zlotys (20 billion US dollars), almost half of the annual state budget. He was promptly 
removed from office but this could not alter the dramatic situation. After the September 
election, the new Cabinet presented a package of decisions aimed at avoiding the col-
lapse of public finances. The measures are stringent. The taxes (both personal and VAT) 
will go up and the public expenditures will be reduced. The accumulated effects of the 
economic slow-down and of the lower budget will lead to the decline in the standard of 
living for the great majority of Poles at least in the first one or two years.  
 When this happens barely two years before the referendum, there is a serious danger 
that the difficult economic situation may tip many voters either to vote against the inte-
gration or to abstain. The correlation between the personal well-being and the support 
for the integration, observed in all sociological surveys in Poland, indicates that the 
worsening of the economic situation may further reduce the support for the integration. 
Leszek Miller and his ministers are aware of such danger. They realise that the public 
relations alone, much as they are needed, will not be able to persuade Poles to vote for if 
they come to the polling stations deeply frustrated. The success of the referendum will 
depend largely on the effects of the government policies in the first two years of the pre-
sent parliamentary term.  
 
 References 
Neumayer, Laure, 1998: Opinion publiques face a l’integration européenne en Hongrie, Pologne 
et Republique Tcheque, Transitions, (39) 2: 75-117 
Europejski barometer Rzeczpospolitej, Rzeczpospolita, December 14, 2001  
Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (CBOS), Opinie o negocjacjach Polski z Unią Europejskią 
poparcie dla integracji, Warszawa, May 1998 
 
